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The Presidency as an Institution
Wilfred E. Binkley
IN ONE OF those exquisite phrases which he so neatly turns Walton
Hamilton characterized the term institution as "a verbal symbol which for
want of a better describes a cluster of social usages.:1 That phrase, a "duster
of social usages," serves to flood-light the concept "institution." As to the
particular institution about to be considered, we seem never to have neg-
lected the presidency as a product of Constitution, statute and judicial in.
terpretation. But if the mythical Man from Mars were to arrive and, by
some miraculous means, were to become cognizant of every clause of the
Constitution, every statu-
tory provision and every
THE AuTHOR (B.S., 1907, Ohio Northern judicial judgment pertain-
University; A.B., 1910, Antioch College; A.M., ing to the President, he
1926, Ph.D., 1936, Ohio State University) is would yet be woefully ig-
Professor of History and Political Science at
Ohio Northern University. He is the author norant of the presidency as
of several books on American government and an institution.
politics. He would lack that
which vitalizes the great
office, that is, the "duster
of social usages" that makes it a dynamic institution. He would know
nothing of those extra-legal organizations, the major political parties, which
exist on a national scale, above everything else, for the purpose of electing
the President and which consequently determine so largely what the presi-
dency has been, is and will be. He would know nothing of the national
nominating conventions which emerged without preconceived design and
the presidential campaigns that follow. He would lack knowledge of the
inauguration and the inaugural parade which are utterly devoid of legal
validity but are profoundly significant of the great institution to the nation
that views the gigantic spectacle from sidelines or as broadcast over the
national hookups. There is the President's leadership of his party and of
Congress, his use of patronage and charm, if any, his tours of the country,
his public addresses and fireside chats. Here is but a meager sampling of
the usages that, in their totality, constitute essentials of the presidency as
an institution.
Walton Hamilton further observes that "institution is the singular of
which mores or the folkways are the plural ' 2 But these mores frequently
L8 ENcYc. Soc. ScI. 84.
'ibid.
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make the transition into what the late Franklin H. Giddings denominated
"stateways," that is, laws with their inevitable sanctions. This transition is
what the philosopher Emerson must have meant when he wrote, "The law is
only a memorandum." He might as well have said, "Here are the mores
which we have reduced to writing in order that they may not be forgotten."
The Constitution and statutes pertaining to the presidency are, as we shall
see, by and large political mores that have somehow made the transition into
stateways.
It was a shrewd observation of President Grover Cleveland that, "Before
I can understand a political problem I have got to know how it originated."
Now that we are to investigate problems of the presidency let us see how the
office came about. We shall discover that it is a peculiarly American insti-
tution, that it had its genesis in the first permanent English settlement in
America, the Jamestown colony in 1607.
The settlement of Jamestown was undertaken as a get-rich-quick enter-
prise. Elizabethan and Jacobean England was fascinated with fantastic tales
of gold and silver and other resources in Virginia, where the rich hauls of
Cortez and Pizarro were, they believed, about to be repeated. The London
Company, a joint-stock corporation, sold stock to eager buyers sure of
enormous dividends. The charter granted by James I was that of a com-
mercial corporation which, of course, required a business manager, desig-
nated by the charter as governor. But since this economic enterprise was
to operate in a wilderness utterly devoid of civil government, the manager
was, by the terms of the charter, incidentally constituted a magistrate to
enforce the laws of England in the Virginia settlement. A similar official
functioned also under the later charters of the Plymouth and Massachusetts
Bay settlements and indeed in all the charter colonies.3 The American
presidency is a lineal descendant of that old colonial office of Governor,
either a grandchild or a great-grandchild of it.
No dividends were ever declared by the London Company, and King
James wound up the venture by annuling the charter when the colony was
seventeen years old. But the King then appointed a royal governor of
Virginia and provided him with a commission conveyed in an elaborate
document including, among other things, the civil powers of governor as in
the charter. In other colonies the letters patent, conveying the land title to
proprietors such as William Penn and Lord Baltimore in Pennsylvania and
Maryland, made the proprietors governors with powers similar to those
previously mentioned in the charter colonies and the royal provinces.
In due time there were thirteen colonies, with thirteen governors, thir-
teen governor's councils evolving into upper branches of a legislature, and
'See these charters in MACDONALD, DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN
HIsToRY 1-90 (1929).
[Sumnmer
THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSTITUTION
thirteen popular assemblies elected by the colonists. The colonial interests
were stubbornly defended by these assemblies against the royal agents, the
colonial governors, who were sometimes practically compelled to come,
hat in hand, to the door of the colonial legislature pleading for funds for
every purpose, even their very salaries. The colonial legislature was abso-
lute master of the purse strings. So miserable did they make the life of the
governor that one American scholar has declared that the American Revolu-
tion was consummated twenty-five years before Lexington.4
At any rate, when independence was achieved and the colonies had be-
come states, the state constitutions they framed promptly reduced the gover-
nors to the "mere ciphers" that Madison pronounced them in the Federalist
papersY So odious indeed had the colonial experience made the very title
"Governor" that four revolutionary states, in search of a decent term, desig-
nated the chief executives of their states "Presidents, '' which title the
framers of the Philadelphia Constitution serenely appropriated for the
chief executive of the United States.
The intense prejudice generated against the executive in colonial times
planted a persistent prejudice against the executive. Repression of the
chief executive was practically a dogma of the Webster-Clay Whigs, and
the Republican party is by no means free from it today. It is scarcely an
exaggeration to say that the grim specter of the old colonial governor to
this very day haunts the chambers of our state legislatures and the halls of
our Congress. The twenty-second amendment to the constitution, limiting
the President to two terms or sometimes a term and a half, and the proposed
Bricker Amendment, limiting the President's negotiating power in foreign
relations, are only the most recent incantations designed to lay the ghost.
There will be others.
Since the Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, had no dele-
gated power to enact statutes, no national executive as such existed in
America prior to the Constitution. It was when the framers of the Constitu-
tion provided the imposing list of legislative powers for Congress 7 that the
creation of a national executive became imperative. This, however, required
no stroke of inventive statesmanship but merely the appropriation and
adaptation of the evolving native American institution of the Executive then
180 years old. The evidence that this is precisely what the framers did is
found in one clause after another of the Philadelphia Constitution. There
IMERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEouRES 34-37 (1926).
'THE FEDERALIsT, No. 48 (Hamilton).
'Johnson, What the Federal Constitution Owes to the Several States, NEw PRINcE-
TON REVIEW (1887). Quoted by 2 BRYCE, AMEmCAN COMMONWEALTH 19
(Commonwealth ed. 1908).
7 U.S. CONST. Art I § 8.
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was no need of inventing a tide for the new American chief executive when
they could merely reach out and appropriate that already used for the chief
executive in Delaware, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and South Carolina.
When the framers made the President Commander-in-Chief they only
copied precisely what the framers of twelve of the thirteen state Constitu-
tions had already done with their chief executives. The President was
given the power of pardon in imitation of the governors of nine of the
states. Almost all of the states prescribed a form of the Executive's oath of
office and apparently Gouverneur Morris only rephrased that of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution in his own incomparable style. "Not creative genius,"
wrote the late Professor Alexander Johnson, "but wise and discreet selection
was the proper work of the Convention."" Verily the President of the
United States was created in the image of the state governor and he is in
fact a glorified state governor.
On one item the framers forgot the art of statesmanship -the method
of electing the President. I can scarcely do better than quote Alexander
Johnson on this matter: "The presidential electoral system was almost the
only feature of the Constitution not suggested by State experience, almost
the only feature that was purely artificial, not a natural growth, and democ-
racy has ridden right over it."' Curiously enough the framers, early in their
deliberations, had decided to have the President elected by Congress just
as the Governor was then elected by the legislature in most states. But this
might have made the President only a bigger "cipher" than the governors.
In plain truth the electoral college was scarcely expected to elect Presi-
dents after Washington would no longer be available. The Constitution
provided that each state was to choose, in any manner that its legislature
might prescribe, a number of electors equal to the total number of its Sena-
tors and Representatives in Congress. These electors, meeting in their
respective state capitols, were to vote for any one they personally thought
suitable for President and Vice-President. Since formal nominations or
political parties were not anticipated, the framers expected that the electoral
votes would be so widely scattered among the many voted for as not to pro-
duce the majority required for election oftener than once in twenty times as
George Mason calculated10 or once in fifty times as he later estimated it. So
the framers provided that the real election would take place in the House
of Representatives, which would ballot on only the five who stood highest in
the scattered balloting of the Electoral College, with each state casting one
vote.
It was the unanticipated emergence of political parties as early as the
third presidential election that upset the calculations of the framers and
JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 6.
'Ibid.
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converted the presidential electors into the automata or dummies that have
transformed the Electoral College into an organ for registering, somewhat
inaccurately, the popular majority. Here is the most influential one of the
"duster of social usages" constituting the institution of the presidency.
Arthur W. Macmahon epitomizes the matter in his statement that "con-
sidered nationally political parties in the United States may be described
as loose alliances to win the stakes of power embodied in the presidency."'1
The powers of the presidency are what our major parties seek to capture and
control. It is the competition for that very power that determines largely
what the presidency as an institution has become and is today. No matter
how bravely a President may proclaim his personal convictions he is in-
evitably the organ of the most influential interest to whom he owes his
election. And Franklin Roosevelt, President by the electoral votes of every
state but two small ones in 1936, will possess and exercise power impossible
to Rutherford B. Hayes, declared elected by the margin of a single furiously
disputed electoral vote. It is a fair approximation to say that the presidency
is what our political parties have made it. Here again is the handiwork of
American folkways and mores with a minimum of stateways.
In our own generation the usages of the Electoral College have come
to make the presidency peculiarly sensitive to minority groups concentrated
largely in metropolitan centers. One of these usages, that long ago became
a stateway, is the election of the presidential electors at large in each state,
instead of by districts as they originally sometimes were. Thus in each state
the election of electors is, for the political parties, a game of all or none. For
example, this makes it possible for the Negro vote in half a dozen big
pivotal states to throw a presidential election to either party. The recent
striking gains in civil rights are largely due to the balance of voting power
wielded by such minority groups in the great cities of pivotal states. One
need only read President Truman's veto of the Taft-Hardey Act to see that
it was consciously designed to retain the party loyalty of a minority group,
labor. The presidential election of 1952 only suspended the decisive func-
tioning of these interest groups as balances of power. It was the stars in
their courses that fought for General Eisenhower - the stars on his uni-
form. He knows he can scarcely depend on astrology for reelection.
Judging by his elaborate legislative program he is learning rapidly the art of
sewing up the support of these minority groups. At any rate it would now
appear that no one need go to jail to obtain social security no matter which
party holds the presidency. The ballots of minorities, with their balances of
"DocUMENTs ILLUSTRATIvE OF TMH FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN UNION,
(Tansill ed.), 69th Congress, Ist Sess., House Document, No. 398, 1st Sess. p. 663,
H. R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong.
11 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 596.
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power functioning through the usages of the Electoral College, compel presi-
dents and presidential candidates to play the game of out-promising each
other in legislative programs. Thus they hope to capture the ballots of the
minorities which collectively constitute the majorities required to elect
Presidents.
The letters of Washington just before he assumed the duties of the
presidency reveal a deep concern as to what the public expected of him and
what it would tolerate in his conduct of the new office. He was acutely
aware of an utter lack of precedents for an American national chief execu-
tive.12 He knew he would be establishing precedents and he desired that
they "may be fixed on true principles." The elaborate inaugural ceremony
accompanying his taking the oath of office did not pass unchallenged.
Today we generally recognize that while the inauguration itself has no
legal force, it nevertheless symbolizes the fact that the President is chief of
state as well as chief executive. But to the post-Revolution purists the in-
auguration was a conspicuous violation of Republican simplicity and an
aping of monarchy.
The elective branch of the colonial legislature had clung to the control of
finance with the tenacity of a bulldog. In this tradition Congress estab-
lished the Treasury Department and required that it report directly to Con-
gress, so that half a century later it was still being debated whether the
Treasury was an executive department. Washington appointed Hamilton
Secretary of the Treasury, and in accordance with the law and the requests
of the House of Representatives, Hamilton made his famous reports to Con-
gress on manufacturers and on finance and pushed through the houses his
famous measures - the Hamiltonian program. What of Washington's
legislative program? There was none. Hamilton, an inveterate Anglophile,
immediately upon appointment had assumed that he was prime minister, in
the tradition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The conduct of the gov-
ernment was rapidly falling into the pattern of a parliamentary system.
Washington, without any conscious shirking of responsibility, was dropping
into the background with a separateness suggestive of the British monarch.3
Here is a striking illustration of the extent to which the presidency is a
"cluster of social usages." How often has the presidency come to a parting
of the ways and taken one instead of another fork of the road? As strong as
the trend toward parliamentary usages then was, it promptly encountered
adverse social forces so deep-seated in the emerging American culture that
the trend was soon reversed.
When Washington in person first delivered to Congress what we today
call the "State of the Union" message, critics promptly dubbed it the
" HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION, 1789 pp. 7, 8 (1948).
1 See BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 37 (1947).
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"Speech from the Throne." When the reply to this message was prepared
by the two houses and then sent to Washingtons residence to be delivered
by the Vice President, it was pronounced downright mimicking of British
practice. A year earlier Patrick Henry, speaking in the Virginia Conven-
tion that ratified the Constitution, had declared that the Constitution
"squinted toward monarchy." Before Washington had been President half
a dozen weeks he received a letter from a friend in Virginia who wrote that
Henry's phrase, "squints toward monarchy," was in every mouth.' 4 It was
a dozen years later that President Jefferson, a son of the Piedmont frontier
and thoroughly habituated to the American folkways, promptly ended the
reign of the "monocrats," as he dubbed the Federalists, and "put the Ship of
State on its Republican tack," to use his own picturesque phrasing. By then
the trend had already set in that, in the milieu of our own political mores,
would transform the presidency into what Grover Cleveland was long after-
ward to characterize as "peculiarly the people's office."
Washington soon needed advice - an advisory council. Every colony
had been provided with a Governor's Council, and this organ had been
evolving into the upper house of the legislature, but without losing all its
executive functions. "Elliott's Debates" on the making and ratifying of
the Constitution of the United States contains nearly a dozen scattered refer-
ences to the United States Senate as a "council to the President," an "advising
body to the executive," a "council of appointment," or a body associated with
the President "to manage all our concerns with foreign nations."' 5 In-
dubitably the Senate is a legitimate child of the Governor's Council, and it
carries to this day vestigial evidence of its parentage. Among these vestiges
are the confirmation of presidential appointees and the ratification of
treaties. Quite naturally, President Washington turned to the Senate as his
councilors. This was not strange at a time when the upper house had only
twenty-two Senators, two states not having yet ratified the Constitution.
Washington made his first visit to the Senate chamber with a set of propo-
sitions concerning a proposed treaty with the Indians. What could be
plainer than the Constitution's provision: "He shall have power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur"? Now Washington would get their advice and
consent on negotiations. Upon arrival he took the chair of the Senate just
as the Governors then did when conferring with their councils. Vice-Presi-
dent Adams read the first proposition for the treaty and turning to the Sena-
tors asked "Do you advise and consent, etc.?" The question was greeted
'" Hart op. cit. supra note 12 at 14.
" 2 ELLIOTr, DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONVENTION
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: 47, 287, 306. (Washing-
ton 1827-46). 3 id. at 220, 221, 489, 491, 493.
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with stony silence. Here was a momentous instant in the laboriously-
emerging institution of the presidency. Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania
finally broke the awkward silence by asking for some of the papers pertain-
ing to the matter and a little later urged that the matter of the treaty be
referred to a committee. Thereupon, according to Maclay, Washington
"started up in a violent fret and said, 'This defeats my every purpose in com-
ing here.' "When Washington left the Senate chamber that day, he is reported
to have said that he would be damned if he would ever come back there.16
Another fork in the road to be taken had been determined. Treaties would
simply have to be negotiated by the President or his agent beforehand and
the draft submitted to the Senate for their consideration in his absence.
In the first session of Congress the Senate confirmed all Washington's
appointees but one. Here was another constitutional power suggesting the
intention of the framers to make the Senate a council for the President that
was to sit with him while considering an appointee. Washington's one
nominee who was not confirmed was to have been collector of customs at
the port of Savannah, to which nominee the Georgia Senators had objected.
The astonished President sent the Senate a message suggesting that, in such
cases, the Senate might ascertain the President's reason for the appointment.
This was ignored and the usage, euphemistically denominated "senatorial
courtesy," had begun.' 7 As a consequence it can be set down that usage has
literally reversed the Constitutional provision, so that it is the Senate that
nominates and the President that gives consent. It was now clear that, no
matter what the framers of the Constitution may have intended, the Senate
simply would not serve as a council advising the President. Usage is a
sovereign that can reduce a provision of the written Constitution with which
it conflicts to sheer dead-letter.
Washington finally got his executive council or advisory group scarcely
by design but almost by accident. The Constitution, with apparently no sug-
gestion of a council, authorizes the President to require, in writing, the
opinion of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments upon
any subject relating to the duties of their respective departments, and Wash-
ington was doing this as early as 1790. His first meeting with his depart-
ment heads as a consultive group occurred in the third year of his presidency
in order to consider what to do about the request of Congress for papers
relating to St. Clair's disastrous defeat by the Indians in the Northwest Ter-
ritory. The President here needed advice on a perplexing issue that had
arisen, and he resorted to the expedient of calling his executive heads to-
gether. It is almost certain that he had no idea whatever of starting a new
institution. It is but one more concrete illustration of the shrewd observa-
tions of the late James Bryce that "historical development is wiser than the
wisest men" and "a succession of small improvements, each made conforma-
bly to existing conditions and habits, is more likely to succeed than a large
[Summer
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scheme made all at once in what may be called the spirit of conscious ex-
periment."'-" It is a significant fact, noted by the late George Burton
Adams, that the British Cabinet system, every essential feature of which is
pure usage, had matured so recently that the framers of our Constitution
were not aware of its existence, and in fact the British Cabinet system was
half a century old before its nature was sufficiently recognized that clear
expositions of it as now understood were published.' 9
There was certainly no prompt recognition that a new usage had been
contributed to the duster constituting the presidency. Gradually, however,
the term "cabinee crept into the vocabulary of the newspapers and letters
of the Executive heads.20 By the end of Washington's eight years the term
was understood. It appeared in Congressional debates in 1798. Marshall
used it in.the Marbury decision in 1803.21 By the end of Jefferson's presi-
dency in 1809 it was a recognized institution. President Jackson was first to
use the term "cabinet" in a presidential message. In 1907 it first appeared
rather incidentally in a statute in the phrase, "the heads of the Executive
Departments who are members of the Presidenes cabinet."22
Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, could not persuade
his President to hold regular cabinet meetings. When they were held a
vote was taken on issues discussed, with Jefferson having a single vote, but
he had usually persuaded the cabinet to the point of unaniminity.23 Jack-
son Largely ignored his Executive heads as counsellors and turned instead to
the coterie of cronies in his famous "Kitchen Cabinet" Some Presidents
have abided by the majority vote of their cabinet, notably Pierce and Bu-
chanan. Lincoln was unquestionably the master of his cabinet. To this
day we can say that the cabinet is not yet a stabilized institution but is still
evolving. As recently as December 29th, 1953, Stewart Alsop was observ-
ing that President Eisenhower "has now made the National Security Coun-
cil the chief instrument of decision on matters of vital importance, that he
has been presiding over it in person, and that it has thus all but replaced the
unwieldy cabinet reducing the out-dated cabinet to a shadow." During the
first year of the Eisenhower administration the National Security Council is
said to have won Presidential approval of 305 major policy decisions. 24
" HART, op. cit. supra note 12 at 86-96.
17Id. at 123.
'1 BRYCE op. cit. supra note 6 at 332..
"ADAMS, .AN OuTLNE SKETCH OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORy 167
(1918).
"LEARNED, THE PREsIDENT's CABRNET 155 (1912).
nMarbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
2'34 Statutes at Large, ch. 1639, p. 993.
"WALKR, MAKING OF TIE NATION 91 (1895).
The Toledo Blade, Dec. 29, 1953.
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Why is the President the Chief of Administration? Practically all the
reasons given by text book or court opinion are not much more than ex
post facto rationalizations of the fait accompli. The Constitution is silent
on the matter, apparently because the framers failed to recognize the dis-
tinct character of administrative power - that is, the "management of men
and materials in accomplishing the purposes of the state" as Leonard D.
White so aptly put it.25 Because of the Constitution's silence on administra-
tion the legislative and executive branches of the federal government
throughout our history as a nation have competed for the control of that
function. They are still competing today. The present administration has
removed key administrators apparently as a consequence of senatorial pres-
sure, and under the same kind of pressure has made appointments to posi-
tions where the appointee could embarrass and harass the executive branch.
I can think of no President less vigilant and firm than the present one in
maintaining the chief executive's constitutional mastery of administration.
The key to the presidential control of administration lies in the question
whether he has the constitutional power to remove executive officers on his
own volition. That question was thoroughly debated in the first session of
the First Congress. A bill investing the President with this very power of
removal, without requiring senatorial consent, was considered then and
dropped. This disposal of the issue has been called a "legislative decision,"2
because it amounted to an interpretation that the Constitution implied the
sole power of removal resided necessarily in the Chief Executive; otherwise
he could not "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" if the Senate,
by sharing the removal power, compelled him to retain subordinates he
did not trust. A statute forbidding the Senate to share in removal power
might have been repealed. An implication or a gentleman's understanding
seemed safer.
It was Andrew Jackson who first put to test the President's power of
removal as a means of control of administration. He even selected the
least likely office in the cabinet on which to make the test. In 1833 he had
appointed William J. Duane Secretary of the Treasury and advised him to
remove the federal deposits of money from the Bank of the United States,
the renewal of whose charter he had just recently vetoed. Now Congress
had by statute specifically vested in the Secretary of the Treasury exclusively
the discretion to remove deposits from the Bank. Duane, quite legally, re-
fused to make the removal and stood firm despite Jackson's patient but
persistent attempts at persuasion. Then Jackson removed Duane and ap-
pointed in his stead Roger B. Taney, who obediently removed the deposits.
Jackson justified his removal of Duane by reasoning that "upon him has
WHITE, PUBLIc ADMINISTRATION 2 (1926).
'HART, op. cit. supra note 12 at 155 ff.
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been devolved by the Constitution and the suffrages of the American people
the duty of superintending the operation of the Executive Departments of
the Government and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed."2' 7 Half
a century later President Hayes, even in spite of a recently enacted Tenure
of Office Act by which the Senate shared in removal power, defied the
Senate by removing some New York customs officers, among whom was
a future President of the United States.2 1 And Grover Cleveland likewise
removed a district attorney in the face of a furious senatorial protest.29 It
was only after President Wilson had removed a postmaster before the ex-
piration of his term of appointment that the question was finally decided in
1926 in the case of Myers v. United States.30 The President has then the un-
questioned constitutional power to remove appointive executive officers and
is consequently as much of a chief of administration as he has the competence
and resolute will to be. Neither constitutional prescription nor statute has
made him such, but rather usage fortified finally by court opinion.
A quarter of a century ago Professor Howard Lee McBain denominated
the President "Chief Legislator." "The prime function of the Executive,"
he wrote, "is not executive at all. It is legislative."31 "Rightly or wrongly,"
he added, "the whole country looks to him, praises or blames him, for what
Congress does or does not do, except of course, when both houses chance
to be in control of the opposite party. 8 2 Here is a statement of plain
fact that would have been incomprehensible in the early days under the
Constitution and indeed at almost any time before 1900. Sixty-five years
ago Senator John Sherman of Ohio advised President-elect Benjamin Harri-
son: '"The President should have no policy distinct from that of the party
and that is better represented in Congress than in the Executive. '33
It was President Theodore Roosevelt who established the first promising
organic connection of the presidency and the Congress by means of White
House conferences on pending legislation with the then master of the House
of Representatives, Speaker Joseph G. Cannon.34 The dethronement of the
Speaker in 1910 ended all possibility of institutionalizing that kind of liai-
son. In 1913 Woodrow Wilson initiated what he conceived to be the
prime ministry of the presidency, which he believed the Constitution invited
' 3 RicHARDsoN, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESDENTS 19 (1927).
2BINKLEY, PowERS OF THE PREsIDENT 167-171 (1937).
m'Id. at 174-182.
=272 U.S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).
'McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSnTIoN 115 (1927).
'Id. at 131.
32 SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS iN HOUSE, SENATE AND CAB-
NET 1032 (1895).
14BUsBEY, UNCLE JOE CANNON 217, 218 (1927).
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in the provisions for the President to give Congress information of the
State of the Union, and recommended measures for their consideration."a
In 1933 Franklin Roosevelt revived what resembled the Wilsonian tech-
nique in legislative leadership. In time he developed a rather definite
formula. Whenever he had an important legislative project in mind, he
would summon to his aid outstanding specialists in the particular field to
conduct the required research. The public would be fed information on the
proposed legislation in order to encourage it to exert its influence on Con-
gress. When, in due time, the message recommending the legislation went
to Congress, President Roosevelt had already held conferences with leaders
of his party in Congress in order to see, among other things, that the bill
would be referred to hospitable committees. Moreover the message recom-
mending the measure would probably have lying right under it the draft of
an appropriate bill with the last "t" crossed and "i" dotted.36 Congress
became accustomed to Presidents' submitting a bill along with a message. In
1947 a Republican leader, Senator Ferguson, in an unguarded moment let
slip an unconscious recognition of this established usage. Complaining that
President Truman was letting his objection to certain pending legislation
leak out of the White House, he said, "If the President wants to tell the
people that he stands for a certain thing he ought to come to the House and
Senate with a message. And he ought to provide a bill if that is exactly
what he wants. 37 When a partisan Republican leader can chide a Demo-
cratic President for not formally proposing legislation and accompanying the
proposal with a bill, there can no longer be any question about the usage of
presidential leadership in legislation.
Of course presidential leadership in legislation runs counter to a strong
Republican party tradition. President Lincoln once accompanied a proposal
for legislation with the draft of a bill,88 but the explosion it created in Con-
gress was so loud that Lincoln's act was repeated by no President for two
generations. But during the first year of the Eisenhower administration
the public grew mor and more critical of the President's failure to assume
the initiative in legislation. When he did finally assert leadership, opinion
polls promptly registered public approval. His prestige as a President de-
pends largely on the percentage of his program he can persuade Congress
to enact.
Few usages have contributed more to making the presidency what it is
today than the National Nominating Convention. Viewed from the gal-
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leries the convention looks as absurd as a typical sitting of the National
House of Representatives. In either case the significant action is invisible
from the point of disadvantage in the gallery. Of course the convention
looks utterly irrational. Successful institutions, however, are not products
of reason and logic but of chance and circumstance. The nominating con-
vention emerged somewhat sheepishly in the 1830's after almost half a
century of groping to fill an interstice in the Constituticn-that is, a
method of reducing the potential multitude of presidential aspirants to a
workable number for the voters, preferably two candidates, one for each
party. The use of the congressional caucus at first for that purpose had
played out by 1824. Then state legislatures began haphazardly nominating
presidential candidates, which method turned out to be impractical. Next,
national gatherings of party members came together, not in delegate-
conventions, but rather in irregular national mass-meetings.3 9 For example,
the so-called convention that nominated Van Buren at Baltimore in 1835
had 626 names on its roll, half of whom were from a single state, Maryland.
Two-thirds were from Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Later each state was allowed to cast as many votes as it had presidential elec-
tors no matter how many delegates appeared. One lone Democrat in one
convention cast all fifteen votes of Tennessee. Ultimately the party sent
from each state its agreed quota of delegates, as is done today. Here is the
perfectly natural evolution of a new institution by the usual trial and error
method. The convention emerged practically when nobody was looking,
which is precisely what makes it so practical.
The key to an understanding of a national convention is that it is man-
aged by professionals -politicians who are experts in social coordination.
These experts have one great objective, namely, manipulating the delegates
so as to pick a potential winner and thereby capture control of the prestige,
power and patronage embodied in the presidency. In the strategy of pick-
ing a winner the managers exercise an acumen and wisdom impossible for
the rank and file of a party functioning individually in a national party
primary. Substituting a presidential primary for the national convention
would alter the very nature of the presidency in an unpredictable manner..
Lincoln would not have had a ghost of a chance in a nominating primary.
The choice of Governor Stevenson, the best candidate the Democrats could
have nominated in 1952, would have been impossible in a nation-wide
primary. Even if he could have been dragged kicking into it, his face was
unfamiliar to the party voters. The voters were more familiar with other
contestants then.
The most recent Republican Convention illustrates the dynamics of
picking a potential winner. Senator Taft was undoubtedly the favorite of
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most of the delegates, but too many of them doubted whether he could be
elected. The contest in the convention turned into a furious battle between
the Republican congressional forces backing Taft and the twenty-some
Republican governors mainly backing Eisenhower. The impasse was
broken by patronage, of which the Republican governors had plenty and
the Republican Congressmen none. Inevitably the candidate nominated
will be debtor to the powerful interests that swung the nomination to him,
no matter how much he may protest his freedom from commitments and
usually "methinks he doth protest too much." The President who has no
powerful party forces behind him rules with a palsied hand. Such is the
nature of government in a sinful world. For us the significant thing is that
the nominating convention is a faithful expression of the genius of the
American people and of its folkways and mores. When we get a better
nominating procedure, it will be one that emerges naturally just as the
convention did; it will never be the brain-child of a genius.
No interpretation of the presidency would be adequate that omitted
the contributions of the great Presidents to the making of the office. If we
may borrow a term from the geologist, let us say that the administration of
each of the great presidents has contributed its stratum of rich alluvial de-
posits. Washington's peculiar gift was in consequence of his superb char-
acter, which made its contribution even before he was chosen President.
We have competent testimony to this fact in a letter written a year after the
Philadelphia Convention by Pierce Butler, one of the delegates. "Entre
Nous," he wrote, "I do not believe they (the executive powers) would have
been so great had not many of the members cast their eyes toward George
Washington (President of the Convention), and shaped their ideas of
the powers to be given the President by their opinions of his virtue."40 To
a degree the office is what it is because it was made for Washington. In
office he gave it a good start.
It was Thomas Jefferson, the third President, despite all his acquired
Eastern polish still a Piedmontese frontiersman at heart, whose role it was
to reorient the developing office of the presidency away from foreign prece-
dents toward its genuinely American charter. Jefferson's keen eye had
appraised Europe as accurately as any American of his day who had so-
journed overseas, but he saw little there to be imitated. Here was our first
astute American politician-statesman, a happy son of the American political
mores, resolutely determined to make the presidency a republican and an
American institution.
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A generation later an upsurge of the American masses, "the common
man," put Andrew Jackson in the White House. Speaking in the then
prevailing classical vogue, his partisans proclaimed him a "tribune of the
people."4' Just as the ancient Roman tribune had shouted his "Veto" into
the patrician Senate in defense of his plebian constituents, so President
Jackson converted the presidential veto into an instrument for the protec-
tion of the interest of the comman man. When Old Hickory retired, it
was impossible to turn the hands of the clock of history back and ever again
make the presidency what it had been before.
Even more than Jackson, Lincoln won the hearts of common folk-
Lincoln who casually touched his hat in return to an officer's salute but
uncovered his head to the men in the ranks, as Noah Brooks observed.
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Woodrow Wilson set the modern and apparently enduring pattern of legis-
lative leadership, in which his disciple, Franklin Roosevelt, managed to
surpass even the master. President Franklin Roosevelt, as an expert in
mobilizing group loyalties with the quid pro quo of group-benefits for
group-ballots, developed to the highest degree the art of group-diplomacy
on which the very existence of American political parties depends. Evi-
dently he set the pattern that President Eisenhower is even now learning,
imitating and practicing, as his current program of legislation indubitably
reveals. President Eisenhower is indeed the fortunate beneficiary of an
incomparable heritage bequeathed to him by a long line of dynamic prede-
cessors. His place in history depends on what he does with that heritage.
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